In the present paper we consider a special class of TU-games -glove market games. Using both analytical and algorithmic approaches we apply the SM -nucleolus -a comparably new solution concept that is based on the idea of the blocking power of a coalition -to this kind of games. We provide analytical formulae for calculation of the SMnucleolus. On the top of this, Potters' algorithm for the prenucleolus has been adapted for finding the SM -nucleolus as well. Some examples are given and explained in the paper. Finally, we discuss similarity and differences that the SM -nucleolus and different solution concepts of TU-games demonstrate for a class of glove market games.
Introduction
In this paper we investigate a special class of cooperative TU-games -glove market games. It is well known that there is a number of solution concepts for these games and all of them have some pros and cons. We consider a comparably new solution concept -the SM -nucleolus that was introduced in [15] . The SM -nucleolus is based on the idea of using the blocking power of a coalition as well as the constructive one and has pretty convenient properties. Another solution concept possessing similar properties is the [0, 1]-nucleolus introduced in [14] as a generalization of the considered solution.
Using both analytical and algorithmic approaches we apply the SM -nucleolus to glove market games and analyze its properties in comparison to the well known and widely used solution concepts such as the prenucleolus [11] and the Shapley value [12] . The analytical formulae that give a simple way for finding the SM -nucleolus is justified in the paper. Moreover, we provide a way for calculation of the pointed solution by using a programming realization of Potters' algorithm. Some significant examples are given and discussed in the paper. The examples illustrate how the total payoff can be divided between the players according to the SM -nucleolus as well as the core, the prenucleolus and the Shapley value. Finally, we show that for such kind of games the SMnucleolus is a more reasonable solution than the core or the prenucleolus. All the same, some similarities of the SM -nucleolus and the Shapley value are noticed. In fact, they have cognate structures, and fully coincide for all three person TU-games.
Preliminary Notes and Definitions
In this paper we deal with special glove market games which are a subclass of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games). First of all, let us give some basic definitions and notations from the cooperative game theory.
A cooperative TU-game is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players and v : 2 N → R is a characteristic function with v(∅) = 0. Here 2 N = {S ⊆ N } is the set of coalitions of (N, v).
Due to the classical cooperative approach we look for ways to distribute the amount v(N ) over the members of the grand coalition.
Denote by X * (N, v) the set of feasible payoff vectors of a game (N, v), i.e.
Here by x(S) we mean i∈S x i (S ⊆ N ). Let G N be the set of TU-games.
Definition 2.3 A preimputation in (N, v) is a group rational payoff vector, i.e. condition (2) is not required.
We denote by X(v) and X 0 (v) the imputation and preimputation sets of the game (N, v), respectively. In this paper the preimputation set X 0 (v) is under consideration.
The SM -nucleolus is based on the prenucleolus approach, therefore, some precise definitions are needed.
Let x be a preimputation in a game (N, v). The excess e(x, v, S) of a coalition S at x is e(x, v, S) = v(S) − x(S).
Let X be an arbitrary nonempty closed set in R N . For each x ∈ R N define a mapping θ such that θ(x) = y ∈ R N , where y is a vector that arises from x by arranging its components in a non-increasing order.
Definition 2.4
1 The nucleolus of X denoted by N (X), or N (N, v, X), is the set of vectors in X whose θ(e(x, v, S) S⊆N )'s are lexicographically least, i.e. N (X) = {x ∈ X : θ(e(x, v, S) S⊆N ) lex θ(e(y, v, S) S⊆N ) for all y ∈ X}.
If X = X(v), it is called the nucleolus of the game (N ).
is called the prenucleolus of the game (PN ).
It follows from [11] that the nucleolus is never empty and consists of a unique point as well as the prenucleolus of the game.
In continuation of the subject we refer to the definition of the SM -nucleolus.
for all coalitions S. The sum-excess of a coalition S ⊆ N at each x ∈ R N is defined as follows
Formula (4) contains two summands -the excess e(x, v, S) w.r.t. characteristic function v and the excess e(x, v * , S) w.r.t. characteristic function v * .
The constructive power of S is the worth of the coalition, or exactly what S can reach by cooperation. Under the blocking power of coalition S we understand the amount v * (S) which this coalition brings to N if the last is formed. In words, the blocking power of a coalition can be judged as a measure of necessity of this coalition for N -how much S contributes to N .
Definition 2.5
The simplified modified nucleolus, or shortly -the SMnucleolus, of a game (N, v) is the set
where θ(e(x, v, S) S⊆N ) is a vector whose components are the sum-excesses arranged in a non-increasing order.
It follows from Definition 2.5 and formula (4) that both the constructive and the blocking powers are taken into account equally.
The following theorem is useful [15] .
Theorem 2.6 Let (N, v) be a TU-game. The SM -nucleolus of (N, v) coincides with the prenucleolus of the constant-sum game (N, w), where
Theorem 2.6 states a direct relationship between the SM -nucleolus of a game (N, v) and the prenucleolus of a corresponding constant-sum game (N, w). This tie confirms that the SM -nucleolus is a singleton, and gives a number of ways for its finding.
Results and Discussion

Glove Market Games
L. Shapley and M. Shubik in [13] proposed to consider a glove market game as a simple market model. This game describes the following situation: there are two types of complementary products on the market and a finite set of firms each of which can produce a product of one type. A customer needs both types of products.
Let N consists of two types of players: N = P ∪ Q where P and Q are disjunct sets of players. Each player of P owns a right-hand glove and each player of Q owns a left-hand glove. If j members of P and k members of Q form a coalition, they have min{j, k} complete pairs of gloves, each being worth 1. Unmatched gloves are worth nothing.
The characteristic function for the game is defined by
Thus, the worth of coalition S is equal to the number of pairs of gloves the coalition can assemble. Without loss of generality, assume |P | ≥ |Q|. This model is quite popular in the cooperative game theory and its core as well as other solution concepts have been already studied (see [1] , [2] , [3] , [8] ).
The core represents a payoff vector where the holders of the scarce commodity (the left-glove owners in our case) obtain a payoff of 1 and the other players obtain nothing. This result holds for |P | = 100 and |Q| = 99 as well as for |P | = 100 and |Q| = 1. Shapley and Shubik in [13] noticed violent insensitivity of the core to the ratio of the dimensions of sets P and Q. In contrast, the Shapley value is sensitive to the relative scarcity of the gloves what is an attractive property of the Shapley value. The SM -nucleolus also possesses this desirable sensitivity.
In this paper, we apply the SM -nucleolus to the glove market games. As a main result, we present analytical formulae for finding the solution for arbitrary finite sets P and Q.
Analytical Formulae for Finding the SM -Nucleolus
Let |P | = p, |Q| = q, P = {i 1 , . . . , i p }, Q = {j 1 , . . . , j q }. Taking into account anonymity of the SM -nucleolus (see [15] ) denote a player from P by i k (i k ∈ P ) and a player from Q by j l (j l ∈ Q). The SM -nucleolus is a payoff vector µ(v) ∈ R p+q with components µ i k for players from P and µ j l for players from Q. We justify analytical formulae for calculation of the SM -nucleolus for arbitrary dimensions of sets P and Q. Theorem 3.1 Let (N, v) be a glove market game with characteristic function (5), p ≥ q. Then the SM -nucleolus µ(v) is defined by the formulae
where i k ∈ P and j l ∈ Q.
We avoid here the proof of the theorem since it is quite ponderous. The proof is based on Theorem 2.6 and Kohlberg theorem (see [4] , [7] ). The presented formulae have been obtained constructively. We select possible sets of coalitions with the minimal sum-excesses and check their for balance by Kohlberg theorem. Going step by step (in fact, we consider consequently cases |P | = p, |Q| = 1; |P | = p, |Q| = 2 and |P | = p, |Q| = q) we have found out that coalitions T ∪ Q and P where T ⊂ P , |T | = |Q|, have the minimal sum-excesses and form a balanced collection, so, the following equalities give the necessary formulae for the SM -nucleolus.
e(x, v, T ∪ Q) = e(x, v, P ), T ⊂ P, |T | = |Q|.
We present here some significant examples to give the intuition of the considered solution concept. The examples demonstrate some similarities and differences of the SM -nucleolus comparing with the well-known solution concepts of TU-games such as the core, the Shapley value, the prenucleolus. 
)
The SM -nucleolus µ(v) = (
The nucleolus as well as the core assigns one to player 3 and zero to the other players. On the other hand, players 1 and 2 together can prevent player 3 from getting 1 by forming a coalition against him. Therefore, together they have the same blocking power as player 3 does. The SM -nucleolus takes into account the blocking power of coalition {1, 2}. It assigns 2 3 to player 3 and 1 6 to players 1 and 2 each. Note that for this game the SM -nucleolus coincides with the Shapley value.
At the same time, we have come across a rather interesting result which indicates that the SM -nucleolus coincides with the Shapley value for an arbitrary three-person TU-game. That was proved in [15] . This gives some insight that we have a solution concept with similar to the Shapley value properties. 
The nucleolus does not assigns any positive payoff to the owners of a righthand glove, the whole amount of the total payoff goes to the holder of the unique left-hand glove. The Shapley value assigns 25 percents of the total payoff to players 1, 2, and 3 altogether, whereas the SM -nucleolus distributes 30 percents of the total payoff between the holders of a right-hand glove. 
In this example the Shapley value assigns 35 percents of the total payoff to players 1, 2, and 3 altogether, whereas the SM -nucleolus distributes 37,5 percents of the total amount between the holders of a right-hand glove.
As a result, we can notice that the SM -nucleolus distributes a bigger part of v(N ) between the players with a non-scarce glove than the Shapley value.
Finally, let us give an example when p = q.
Example 3.5 Suppose that P = {1, 2, 3}, Q = {4, 5, 6}. The resulting payoff vectors for this game are presented below.
The core
The prenucleolus
The Shapley value ϕ(v) = (
As a matter of fact, all players in this game are treated equally and all considered solution concepts (the core, the prenucleolus, the Shapley value and the SM -nucleolus) propose the same payoff vector as a solution of the game.
These examples illustrate also what happens with the right-and left-hand glove owners' payoffs according to the SM -nucleolus when changing the dimensions of sets P and Q.
Conclusion
Following the theoretical results we can conclude that dividing the total payoff according to the core (the nucleolus) is not acceptable for the most of players in these games. It is worth to notice that both groups of players need each other. Obviously, left-hand glove holders cannot obtain any positive payoff without right-hand glove holders. In this sense, the SM -nucleolus and the Shapley value propose to divide the total payoff between the players more "fairly".
At the same time, it is difficult to make a certain conclusion about differences between the SM -nucleolus and the Shapley value. We can only note that the analytical formulae for finding the SM -nucleolus is considerably easier than the ones for the Shapley value.
The obtained formulae for calculation of the SM -nucleolus are additionally verified by means of algorithmic approach.
Computational complexity of the SM -nucleolus is comparable with that of the prenucleolus due to Theorem 2.6. Therefore, the SM -nucleolus can be computed by each of the presently known algorithms for the prenucleolus (for example, [5] , [9] , [10] ). In fact, any prenucleolus algorithm for TU-games can be adapted to find the SM -nucleolus. We apply Potters' algorithm for this purpose. The computer program that realizes the algorithm has been developed by Olga Dmitrenko 2 . The SM -nucleolus has been calculated for different glove market games with a help of the computer program. The results are identical to the ones obtained by formulae (6) in the examples above.
In continuation of this work we shall consider a case when one of the players (a right-hand or a left-hand glove owner) is additionally given one more glove. The solution of the changed game might be a topic for our next paper.
